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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ANGEL SANTOS; PHILLIP P.G. WEBB; DEALREE BROADY;  
CRISTINO FELIX; JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
MARY REINKE; HUDSON COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE;  
MYLES CAPPIELLO; NEIL HICKEY; NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE;  
PAULA DOW, formerly Ann Milgram, Office of the Attorney General;  
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ANTHONY PICCONE, Deputy Attorney General;  
MICHAELANGELO CONTE; RENEEA ROSE SIBAYIAN;  
JERSEY JOURNAL, INC.; JOHN DOE(S) 1 THROUGH 10 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-03876) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 31, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 














 Adel Mikhaeil appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey in his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  As the appeal does 
not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the decision of the District 
Court. 
 The procedural history of this case and the details of Mikhaeil’s claims are well 
known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s memoranda, and need not be 
discussed at length.  Briefly, in August 2008, Mikhaeil was arrested by police in Jersey 
City, New Jersey and charged with witness tampering and making terroristic threats 
against Angel Santos.  Ultimately, the charges were dismissed.  In July 2010, Mikhaeil 
filed a complaint under § 1983, raising claims arising from the arrest.  Named as 
defendants were the complaining witness, Angel Santos; the Jersey City Police 
Department and several of its officers (“Jersey City Police Defendants”); the Hudson 
County Prosecutor’s Office, the prosecuting attorney, and another employee of that 
Office (“HCPO Defendants”); the State of New Jersey, the State Police, the State 
Attorney General, and individual state agents (“State Defendants”); and the Jersey 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Journal newspaper and several staff members (“Jersey Journal Defendants”).1  During the 
course of the proceedings, the Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss and for 
summary judgment.   
 On June 13, 2011, the District Court granted motions to dismiss that had been filed 
by the HCPO Defendants, the State Defendants, and the Jersey Journal Defendants, 
dismissing the claims against those sets of defendants.  The action continued against 
Santos and the Jersey City Police Defendants on the remaining claims.  On December 14, 
2012, the District Court granted the Jersey City Police Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  Thereafter, on December 1, 2014, the District Court dismissed the claims 
against Santos, the only remaining defendant.  Finally, on July 16, 2015, the District 
Court entered a final order in the case dismissing cross-claims that had been raised by the 
HCPO Defendants.  This timely appeal followed.   
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary 
review over an order granting summary judgment.  DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 
                                              
1 In his complaint, Mikhaeil alleged that: the Jersey City Police Department was liable for 
his false arrest and imprisonment (Count 1); Officers Myles Cappiello and Neil Hickey 
failed to adequately investigate Santos’ complaint before recommending charges (Count 
2); Deputy Attorney General Anthony Piccone’s criminal prosecution of Mikhaeil was 
improper (Count 3); the Office of the Attorney General failed to adequately train its 
employees which resulted in Mikhaeil being deprived of his constitutional rights (Count 
4); the Jersey Journal Defendants withheld pertinent information from police and thus, 
were also responsible for his false arrest and imprisonment (Count 5); Defendants 
Piccone, Hickey, Cappiello and Mary Reinke, an employee in the prosecutor’s office, 
worked together to arrest and imprison him in order to procure his guilty plea in another 
criminal matter (Count 6). 
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(3d Cir. 2004).  Our review of the District Court’s earlier dismissal orders is plenary.  
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may summarily affirm when 
an appeal presents us with no substantial question.  See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Upon 
review of the record, and for substantially the same reasons given by the District Court, 
we will affirm.  
  As we noted above, Mikhaeil’s complaint stated claims under § 1983 against 
numerous defendants, several of whom moved to dismiss his complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Blanket assertions and 
conclusory statements by themselves do not suffice to show plausibility.  See Renfro v. 
Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 First, the District Court properly dismissed Mikhaeil’s claim against the Hudson 
County Prosecutor’s Office.  Because that Office is a state agency, not a local 
governmental body, it is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983.  See Estate of 
Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 854-55 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding 
that New Jersey county prosecutor’s offices are considered state agencies for § 1983 
purposes when fulfilling their law enforcement and investigative – as opposed to 
administrative – roles).  Further, the District Court correctly held that the prosecuting 
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attorney was immune from suit for his role in prosecuting Mikhaeil’s criminal case.  See 
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992).  Additionally, the District 
Court correctly dismissed Mikhaeil’s claim against Mary Reinke, an HCPO employee.  
Among other things, Mikhaeil did not allege facts establishing that Reinke had the 
requisite personal involvement with Mikhaeil’s case.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).2 
 The District Court also appropriately dismissed Mikhaeil’s claims against the 
Jersey Journal Defendants.  To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a 
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States committed by 
a person acting under color of state law.  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  The 
Jersey Journal Defendants are private actors—not state actors.  Although private 
individuals may nonetheless be liable under § 1983 if they have conspired with or 
engaged in joint activity with state actors, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 
(1980), as the District Court noted, Mikhaeil did not adequately allege the existence of a 
conspiracy involving these Defendants to deprive him of his rights.3  
 Lastly, the District Court did not err in dismissing the State Defendants.  Insofar as 
they were sued for damages in their official capacities, they are entitled to Eleventh 
                                              
2 Mikhaeil likewise failed to establish that the Attorney General had any personal 
involvement in his case. 
 




Amendment immunity.  The Eleventh Amendment protects a state and its employees 
from federal suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity, or the 
state has waived its own immunity.  Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 
254 (3d Cir. 2010); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity through the enactment of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979), and New Jersey has not 
waived its immunity in federal court, see Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port 
Auth., 819 F.2d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).  Therefore, the District Court correctly 
concluded that the State Defendants were entitled to Eleventh-Amendment immunity 
from Mikhaeil’s official-capacity claims.  To the extent that Mikhaeil intended to impose 
individual liability on the State Defendants, for the reasons carefully identified by the 
District Court in its thorough opinion, those claims were also properly dismissed.4 
 We now turn to the District Court’s order granting the Jersey City Police 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper where, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all 
inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
                                              
4 Additionally, to the extent Mikhaeil alleged that any of the Defendants violated his 
rights under state law, those claims were subject to dismissal because he did not comply 
with the notice requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  See N.J. Stat. Ann.  




party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. 
Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 First, we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary 
judgment as to Mikhaeil’s claims against the individual police officers named in the 
complaint.  To prevail on a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment under § 1983, a 
plaintiff must show that he was arrested without probable cause.  Groman v. Twp. of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995); accord Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 
136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (“The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest 
. . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the 
arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the 
offense.”).  Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or 
circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being 
arrested.”  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 For the reasons outlined by the District Court, the record supports the conclusion 
that there was sufficient information from which a jury could conclude that there was 
probable cause to arrest Mikhaeil for terroristic threats and witness tampering.  
Additionally, even if their actions were unreasonable, we would agree with the District 
Court that the named officers were entitled to qualified immunity.  See Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).   
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 The District Court also correctly determined that the Jersey City Police 
Department was not a proper party to this action.  Although local governmental units may 
constitute “persons” against whom suit may be lodged under § 1983, a city police 
department is a governmental sub-unit that is not distinct from the municipality of which 
it is a part.  See, e.g., Bonenburger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993).  Even construing 
Mikhaeil’s complaint liberally to allege a claim against Jersey City, we conclude that 
summary judgment was appropriate.  The Supreme Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence 
“require[s] a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under  
§ 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”  
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).  This requires a plaintiff to show 
that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the 
injury alleged.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  In this case, however, Mikhaeil failed to 
allege any action by Jersey City, let alone “deliberate conduct” that would show the City 
to be the “moving force” behind Mikhaeil’s alleged injuries. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of District Court. 
